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Expanding the Welfare State after the Golden Age: The Case of 
Switzerland 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses whether Switzerland has still expanded its social programmes after 
the end of the so-called golden age. Quantitative evidence points to this trend and ana-
lysing reforms in pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance and family pol-
icy reinforces this conclusion, with the most important elements being the creation of 
mandatory unemployment and health insurance as well as occupational benefits within 
the Swiss pension scheme. Swiss family policy was clearly enhanced during the last 30 
years, as were means-tested supplementary benefits for low income pensioners. Still 
Switzerland witnessed cutbacks, too, the best examples of which are the higher retire-
ment age for women in both the first (state) and second (occupational) pillar of old age 
protection, substantial benefit reductions in unemployment insurance and higher co-
payments in health insurance. All things considered, qualitative analysis however sup-
ports the notion of welfare state expansion in Switzerland since the mid-1970s and 
clearly contradicts the “race to the bottom” approach. But expenditure growth does not 
only reflect an enhancement of social protection but also socioeconomic factors, mainly 
low economic growth rates during the period under scrutiny and a higher number of 
benefit recipients (mainly in unemployment insurance and pensions). 
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Expanding the Welfare State after the Golden Age: The Case of 
Switzerland 
I.  INTRODUCTION* 
It is generally acknowledged that modern welfare states have left the so-called golden 
age (Flora 1986). Since the mid-1970s, endogenous pressures (e.g. rising unemploy-
ment, increasing public debt, changing demographics) as well as exogenous ones (espe-
cially increased international competition) are seen as putting the welfare state under 
heavy strain. However, the comparative welfare state literature shows less unity with 
regard to the overall direction of welfare state reforms under these changed circum-
stances. A pessimistic line of reasoning expects these pressures to result in a “race to the 
bottom” of modern welfare states (e.g. Narr/Schubert 1994; Altvater/Mahnkopf 1999; 
Tanzi 2002). According to these scholars, social standards will decline and welfare 
states converge towards a liberal or residual model, basically providing means-tested 
benefits. Others suggest that these exogenous and endogenous pressures might even 
further welfare state expansion by creating new social risks not covered by existing so-
cial programmes, like for example new social groups prone to poverty (e.g. Bonoli 
2005). As least as contended as the impact of increased problem pressure on welfare 
state development is the role of politics and institutions under this changed environment 
of the welfare state. First of all, do they still matter for social-policy making or has the 
market become the main driving force? And if they matter what mechanisms are at 
work? Does for example a dense institutional structure with many veto players (Tsebelis 
2002) as in Switzerland make welfare state change less likely than a high degree of con-
centration of political power? And do left parties - traditionally weak in Switzerland - 
still leave a clear imprint on the welfare state?  
This paper will analyse welfare state development in Switzerland since the mid-
1970s. Since social expenditure data suggests that Switzerland – in contrast to most 
other western welfare states – has still expanded its welfare state, it clearly represents an 
interesting case to look at. Therefore, this paper will look at reforms in the core pro-
grammes of the Swiss welfare state and compare them with regard to their scope and 
direction (expansion versus retrenchment). By expansion, this paper mainly understands 
increased coverage, higher benefits and the creation of new programmes to cover new 
social risks. Has the Swiss welfare state really witnessed an expansion as suggested by 
expenditure data and if so, is there a uniform trend of expansion across all these pro-
grammes, or did some experience retrenchment instead? 
                                                 
*  I would like to thank Peter Starke, Claire Fayon, Herbert Obinger and two anonymous reviewers for comments 
on this paper. 
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This paper will analyse federal welfare state development in Switzerland, that is, pol-
icy reforms in the fields of pensions, health, unemployment insurance and family pol-
icy. Starting with a short overview over the Swiss political system and the basic struc-
ture of the Swiss welfare state at the end of the golden age, this paper then presents re-
cent developments in total social expenditure and programme-related expenditure. The 
final, more extensive section will portray welfare state reforms between 1975 and 2005 
in the aforementioned fields. As it is not unusual that reforms fail in referenda, brief 
descriptions of such unsuccessful revisions will also be presented and contrasted with 
the successful ones. The same applies to people’s initiatives, whereby citizens can pro-
pose constitutional amendments, but their chance of success is much lower than for 
governmental and parliamentary proposals. Although some attempts will be made at 
explaining the direction of recent welfare state developments in Switzerland, the main 
focus will be on a description of changes since 1975.  
II.  STARTING POINT: THE SWISS WELFARE STATE AT THE END OF THE 
GOLDEN AGE 
The Swiss political system is characterised by a strong fragmentation of power, so that a 
large number of actors is involved in decision-making. The resulting necessity for com-
promises makes lopsided measures unlikely. One reason is strong federalism. Cantonal 
influence on the federal level comes through three main channels: the upper chamber of 
parliament, the constitutional right to be heard in the pre-parliamentary consultation 
process and the fact that constitutional change demands the majority of popular votes in 
a majority of cantons as well as a majority of votes in the whole country. Trade unions 
and business organisations also have the right to be heard in the pre-parliamentary deci-
sion-making process. The Swiss federal government (Federal Council) is a collegial 
body where the four major parties (Liberals, Christian Democrats, Social Democrats 
and the conservative Swiss People’s Party) are represented with a share unchanged1 
since 1959. Several instruments of direct democracy enable citizens to overrule any 
major decision on the federal level: A referendum is compulsory for all amendments to 
the constitution; through the optional referendum, the people can challenge parliamen-
tary bills or decrees; and with the people’s initiative, citizens may seek a decision on an 
amendment to the constitution.2 Although Switzerland knows legislative competencies 
                                                 
1  The elections of 2003 provoked the first modification of the so-called “magic formula” when as a result of 
changed electoral support the Christian Democrats lost one seat to the conservative Swiss People’s Party.  
2  Since 2003, a new type of initiative exists in Switzerland, where parliament decides whether to translate the 
proposal (or the parliamentary counter-proposal) into a legislative or constitutional amendment. It has not been 
used yet.  
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 28) 
- 3 - 
on all three political levels (Federation, cantons and municipalities), most of the social 
policy legislation is decided on the federal level.  
At the end of the golden age, Switzerland disposed of a rather lean system of social 
protection, especially when compared to its neighbouring countries. Only two social 
insurances were universal, i.e. covering the entire resident population. These were old 
age and survivors’ insurance (AHV) as well as disability insurance. Old age and survi-
vors’ insurance was based on a pay-as-you-go system with parity contributions of em-
ployees and employers as well as state-subsidies. Benefits and contributions were earn-
ings-related and there was no ceiling for contributions while benefits varied between a 
floor and a ceiling. Within these limits, benefit levels depended on the contribution re-
cord (Bonoli/Gay-des-Combes 2002: 5). Between its creation in 1946 and the mid-
1970s, old-age and survivors’ insurance had experienced eight reforms, all directed at 
enhancing benefits (for details see Obinger 1998b: 43). Although the scheme had al-
ways aimed at covering the basic needs of retirees, only in 1972 benefits had been fi-
nally adapted to the postulated aim (Lengwiler 2003: 42; for details see Obinger 1998b: 
43). Since 1965 means-tested supplementary benefits (EL) supported pensioners on low 
income, benefits which also applied to disability insurance. Financing was entirely 
based on taxes. Health care insurance was voluntary with public subsidies to (mostly 
private) health funds and only regulated by a framework law stating minimum benefits. 
The insurance was based on a pay-as-you go system with individual flat-rate premiums 
depending on age at entry and gender but unrelated to income. In 1964, a revised system 
of public subsidies to health funds and important cost sharing3 had been introduced 
(European Observatory on Health Care Systems 2000: 7). Except for this modification, 
Swiss health insurance had remained largely unchanged since its creation in 1911 (Ob-
inger 1998b: 40) and was still in sharp contrast to many social insurance systems in 
Europe as it was designed largely along the lines of private insurance (e.g. flat-rate pre-
miums according to age, gender and health as well as private insurance companies). 
Though increasing problem pressure had put a more encompassing revision on the fed-
eral agenda as early as the mid-1960s, several reform attempts had failed (for details see 
Wyss/Lorenz 2000: 206). The design of unemployment insurance much resembled the 
one of health insurance: It also was voluntary,4 based on federal subsidies to private, 
parity and public unemployment funds as well as only employees’ contributions and 
regulated only by a framework law on minimum standards. By virtue of voluntary in-
                                                 
3  Cost sharing consists of co-payments – a proportional payment of the bill the suppliers present to the insurance 
company – and the franchise payment, a fixed amount insured have to pay before the health fund’s obligation be-
gins (Theurl 1999: 348).  
4  In both programmes, cantons were entitled to declare it mandatory for parts of or the whole cantonal population.  
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 28) 
- 4 - 
surance and favourable economic conditions - especially spectacularly low levels of 
unemployment -, affiliation remained rather modest. Unemployment was primarily kept 
to a minimum by regulating the labour supply: In times of decreasing demand for la-
bour, restrictive work and residency permit regulations were used to make foreigners 
leave the labour market while women were discouraged from entering it, for example by 
lacking infrastructure for child-care (Schmidt 1995; Wicki 2001). Family policy can be 
considered as the “step-child” of the Swiss federal welfare state, with its development 
marked by both sovereign and parliament preventing an enlargement of federal in-
volvement (Herzig 1995: 181). According to the Swiss constitution, the federal gov-
ernment was only entitled to legislation in the fields of family allowances and maternity 
insurance (maternity leave, continuous payment of wages). Yet, even in these two do-
mains, legislation was scarce. Among family allowances, apart from federal benefits for 
small farmers and agricultural employees, various cantonal allowances existed, differing 
in type, level and conditions for entitlement. Until the mid-1970s, several attempts at 
broadening the coverage of federal family allowances had failed. The same was true for 
the creation of a federal maternity insurance, wherefore social protection during mater-
nity was regulated by various uncoordinated laws and with different treatment of 
women according to their length of employment (for details see BSV 2003: 3). As a 
consequence, Switzerland was the only EU- or EFTA-country not providing for a ma-
ternity insurance (Année Politique Suisse 1994: 241).  
III. EXPANDING THE SWISS WELFARE STATE?  
1. Quantitative evidence  
Figure 1 illustrates that the development of social public expenditure in Switzerland is 
rather unusual in interna-
tional comparison after the 
end of the golden age. Start-
ing with levels comparable 
to the Southern European 
countries, Switzerland has 
witnessed a substantial in-
crease in social spending 
since the beginning of the 
1990s, subsequently catch-
ing-up with continental wel-
fare states and even surpass-
ing them at the end of the 
1990s. Given that most 
Figure 1:  Social spending in Switzerland and three 
families of nations, 1980-2001 
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countries in the OECD world have imposed retrenchment measures during that period, 
this huge rise is puzzling and points rather to an expansion of the Swiss welfare state. 
Measuring Swiss welfare state effort (social expenditure) as a proportion of total public 
expenditure shows a similar 
picture (see Obinger et al 
2005a: 163). Clearly, the 
Swiss welfare state is not 
retreating.   
When we break down total 
spending in its programme-
related components, the 
picture gets more nuanced. 
Social expenditure per cap-
ita illustrates a continuous 
rise of welfare state spend-
ing, especially in the 1990s. 
Real expenditure on old age 
cash benefits per person 
aged 65 and over increased 
steadily, but spending on 
active and passive labour 
market policy per unemployed was much more volatile as it depends much more on the 
business cycle. Finally, health expenditure per capita remained rather constant during 
the period under scrutiny and is definitely not indicative of retrenchment. Unfortunately, 
data on family expenditure are not available for Switzerland, at least not for the whole 
period analysed here. Still, the adjustment of expenditure to programme-specific 
caseloads largely confirms the trend of increasing social expenditure in Switzerland.   
2.  Qualitative evidence: welfare state reforms  
While general social expenditure and programme-related expenditure data rather point 
at an expansion of the Swiss welfare state, it is difficult to deduct the direction of 
change from expenditure data alone. Generally it is agreed that for a study of social pol-
icy change, expenditure data should be supplemented with qualitative analysis since 
“spending is generally only one of several routes to a given policy objective and be-
cause different countries employ quite different mixes of policy instruments to achieve 
similar policy goals” (Castles 1994: 249). That is why I now turn to a more detailed 
description of changes in the different social programmes.  
Figure 2:  Programme-specific expenditure in Swiss 
Francs at constant 1995 prices  
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2.1. Unemployment insurance  
In 1974/75, the repercussions of the first oil shock hit Switzerland. GDP dropped and 
unemployment figures rose temporarily. The decrease of GDP in 1975 and 1976 was 
strongest within the OECD but remained relatively brief and already in 1977 growth 
rates took up (Mach 1999: 30). Unemployment peaked in 1976 with a rate of 0.7 per-
cent of the labour force (see appendix) but very soon Switzerland was back to real full 
employment, mainly by sending foreign workers home (Obinger 1998a: 83).  Although 
unemployment rates were very modest in international comparison,5 “the experience 
1974-75 made clear to the public, that full employment which existed since the late 
1930s, cannot be taken for granted in the future” (Armingeon 1999: 179).  
As implicated by the economic background and its perception in Switzerland, re-
forming voluntary unemployment insurance was a clear priority. Apart from being 
solely a reaction to the recession of the 1970s, creating a new system of unemployment 
insurance was supposed to be an adequate precaution to a possible worsening of the 
labour market in the future (Bundesrat 1975: 1563). More specifically, low coverage 
and bad distribution of risks – resulting in several funds having financial troubles – be-
came important problems which the federal government wished to tackle (ibid: 1654). 
Although the number of insured persons had strongly increased in 1974, unemployment 
insurance in 1975 covered only about 32 percent of total wage earners (Année Politique 
Suisse 1975: 127-128). Bad distribution of risks primarily resulted from the financial 
independence of funds as well as funds recruiting by branches or regions (ibid: 128). To 
tackle these problems, the federal government first of all proposed mandatory insurance, 
which in turn required an amendment of the constitution since until then the federal 
government was not entitled to create such insurance.6 The draft provided for mandatory 
insurance for all employees, which, for the first time, was to be financed not only 
through employees’ (as before) but also through employers’ contributions. Also, it 
brought in some active measures. It found the support of the majority of political actors 
and interest groups and was accepted by the people in a mandatory popular vote in 
1976, necessary for constitutional amendments. Replacing voluntary with mandatory 
unemployment insurance constituted a crucial modification of the Swiss welfare state. 
Yet, because of unemployment steadily rising, the constitutional revision had already 
been preceded by several urgency measures, for example prolonging the period of bene-
fit receipt (for details see Année Politique Suisse 1975: 127). Constitutional change re-
                                                 
5  Compared to other OECD-countries, the Swiss unemployment rate had been the lowest in the 1970s (and 1980s) 
(Armingeon 1999: 179).  
6  Every federal legislative competency has to be explicitly named in the Swiss constitution (Art. 3 Federal Consti-
tution).  
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sulted in an interim arrangement which was transferred into ordinary legislation in 
1982.7 In addition to what the interim arrangement brought about, the law included 
measures such as compensation in case of employers’ insolvency. The law also pro-
vided for a stepwise reduction of benefits after a certain period of time (degression), 
except for some recipients like elderly unemployed (Obinger 1998b: 82). Put simply, it 
“combines tight controls with relatively generous benefits” (Obinger et al 2005b: 283).  
During the 1980s, unemployment insurance was further modified, both by means of 
legislative amendment and by ordinances. Unemployed persons benefited from a slack-
ening of mandatory control exigencies and of measures relative to holidays. Employers, 
on the other hand, profited from higher compensations in case of reduced hours. A mi-
nor legal revision primarily modified compensations in case of reduced hours and ad-
verse weather as well as benefit degression (for details see Année Politique Suisse 1990: 
229).  
In 1991 Switzerland was again hit by a recession, which distinguishes itself from the 
economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s by both its greater length and impact. Economic 
development stagnated at an average growth rate of 1.1 percent per year. This was fol-
lowed by budgetary crisis at all three political levels (federal, cantonal and municipal). 
Federal debts more than doubled (Année Politique Suisse 1998: 152). As a conse-
quence, financial reorganisation became one political priority of the 1990s (as well as of 
the 2000s), which resulted in several saving measures as well as constitutional amend-
ments aiming at balancing the federal budget (see for example Armingeon 2003; 
Bonoli/Gay-des-Combes 2002; Obinger 1998b). Again, unemployment rose sharply and 
reached a record high for the whole period since World War II in 19978 with 4.1 (5.2 
according to the Swiss definition) of the labour force. Crucial to the big rise of unem-
ployment in the 1990s was the fact that the traditional way of regulating labour supply 
had become less effective because of the introduction of mandatory insurance, the rising 
number of foreigners with permanent residency permits and modified employment pat-
terns of women (Schmidt 1995). Finally, the expansion of unemployment insurance 
provided a further incentive for dismissals during the recession, whereby costs were 
externalised at the disadvantage of unemployment insurance (Obinger 1998b: 86).  
Against the background of the recession, increasing outlays and stagnating revenues 
soon created a deficit in the unemployment insurance compensation fund. As a result, 
“the scheme was unable to meet its liabilities and had to borrow funds from the general 
                                                 
7  Since unemployment had again been rising since 1981, another set of urgency measures had by then also been 
adopted, anticipating some of the new regulations and entitling the federal government to increase the maximum 
income subject to contributions (for details see Année Politique Suisse 1982: 135).  
8  Unemployment levels were however still low by international standards (Flückiger 1998: 370).  
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government budget” (Bonoli 1997: 122). In the 1990s, mandatory unemployment insur-
ance was subject to several reforms, all raising contributions.  
The 1993 urgent federal decree9 combined increased social protection with savings, 
necessary in the face of the bad financial situation of unemployment insurance. More 
specifically, it brought about a longer entitlement period on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, a reduction of the replacement rate (from 80 to 70 percent of insured in-
come, except for persons with dependent children or on very low income as well as dis-
abled persons), incentives for temporary employment of unemployed persons as well as 
a stricter definition of “adequate work” – now jobs with lower wages than insurance 
benefits were adequate. Despite opposition from both sides of the political spectrum, 
parliament voted this rather balanced reform and it even survived an optional referen-
dum, launched by the left Party of Labour, targeting first and foremost at the lower 
compensation rate and the new definition of adequate work. 
The fact that the urgent federal decree was limited until the end of 1995 gave the au-
thorities time to prepare a more encompassing reform. The governmental proposal re-
mained in the line of the 1993 federal decree as it seemed able to generate a certain con-
sensus (Bonoli 1999: 67). Here, the governmental draft kept the lower compensation 
rate as well as the tighter definition of “adequate work”. The most important new ele-
ments were the strengthening of benefit degression as well as the taking into account of 
upbringing for the calculation of the contribution period and a longer period of benefit 
receipt. But since the governmental proposal was met with vehement critics of labour 
unions and employers, finding a compromise in parliament proved to be extremely dif-
ficult and the revision was much delayed.  
As a consequence, parliament voted another urgent federal decree which anticipated 
some regulations of the proposed revision. Amongst other things, this decree provided 
that contributions exceeding 2 percent of income were earmarked for reducing the in-
surance’s debts and a new general waiting period (differentiated according to income).  
Reaching a compromise for the general revision of unemployment insurance was 
much harder but an agreement was finally reached in two steps: First, by including the 
social partners and secondly by accommodating cantonal interests. While the Council of 
States – being the first chamber to work on the proposal10 – accepted the governmental 
                                                 
9  These laws come into affect immediately after their parliamentary adoption and therefore cannot be delayed by 
optional referendum. Still, they have to be temporarily limited. If they are planned to be effective for more than 
one year, a special referendum applies: In case such a referendum is launched and successful, the decree expires 
after one year (Linder 1999: 247).   
10  Governmental proposals are first assigned to one chamber of parliament (“Erstrat”). The presidents of both cham-
bers agree on the assignment. If the drafts of both chambers differ after the first treatment, the navette-procedure 
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draft with only minor modifications, the whole revision process took a new turn in the 
National Council. Here, the responsible committee set up a working group as it feared 
that the tense political atmosphere, especially referendum threats from capital and la-
bour, might endanger the whole revision project (Giriens/Stauffer 1999: 117). This 
working group, which consisted of representatives of capital and labour as well as the 
federal administration, was able to find a new compromise (Bonoli 1999: 67), based on 
the concept of active labour market policies: While labour unions accepted some 
retrenchment in passive unemployment insurance, employers accepted active labour 
market policy (Armingeon 2003: 182) and higher contributions11. The idea was to redu-
ce entitlements to “normal” allowances (except for the elderly), while “special allowan-
ces” should only be granted to unemployed persons in training courses, employment 
programmes, getting self-employed etc. By deciding that participation in active labour 
market programmes would no longer be considered as a working period, the maximum 
period of benefit receipt was de facto limited to two years (for details see Bonoli 1999: 
68). Before, benefits could be drawn almost indefinitely in case of participation in such 
programmes. The reintegration places for active labour market policies should be provi-
ded by cantons which should at the same time create regional employment agencies to 
replace municipal ones. Social partners and the federal administration also agreed on a 
less strict definition of “adequate work” and on an abandonment of benefit degression 
(Giriens/Stauffer 1999: 138). The whole proposal as well as modifications made by its 
committee - especially the creation of a general waiting period as claimed by the politi-
cal right - was broadly accepted by the National Council. However, after having ac-
commodated social partners’ opposition, in the Council of States debates now primarily 
focused on cantonal issues: The number of active labour market places to be offered by 
cantons, financial compensation in case they offer less and the issue of cantonal non-
repayable loans to unemployment insurance. But finally in 1995, cantonal non-
repayable loans were abandoned and “cantons accepted that they were to provide a large 
number of jobs in the context of the active policy, in return for reduced contributions to 
the unemployment insurance fund and for more flexibility with regard to the absolute 
number of jobs” (Armingeon 2003: 182). Overall, the shift to active labour market poli-
cies was a major transformation of Swiss unemployment insurance. Although a cantonal 
                                                                                                                                               
(“Differenzbereinigungsverfahren”) begins, where the draft is again treated (maximum twice) by both chambers 
of parliament. If differences pertain after three rounds, the conciliation conference (“Einigungskonferenz”) – 
composed of members of both chambers’ responsible committees – tries to find a compromise which then has to 
be approved by both chambers.   
11  Apart from generally higher contributions, a new “solidarity contribution” on higher incomes was created but 
temporarily limited until the insurance’s debt with the government was repaid.  
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labour union section as well as some unemployment committees tried to attack the revi-
sion by referendum, they were not able to collect enough signatures to enforce a popular 
vote.  
While higher contributions allowed the insurance deficit to be absorbed, the increase 
of expenses provoked by the measures of active labour market policies brought yet 
again the budget in the red (Bonoli 1999: 68). Within the scope of measures for the re-
organisation of the federal budget, another urgent federal decree was voted by parlia-
ment in 1996, basically focusing on expenditure cuts (e.g. through lower benefits, 
stricter definition of adequate work). Optional referendum was launched by a local 
committee for the unemployed, mainly arguing that the federal government was aiming 
at the wrong target by focusing on the unemployed instead of fighting unemployment 
(Wisler/Marquis/Bergman 1997: 17). The result of the popular vote was very narrow, 
with 50.8 percent of voters rejecting the decree.  
Alternative ways to reduce the insurance deficit were settled at informal round table 
talks with the participation of social partners in 1998. Participants decided that the third 
income percentage for unemployment insurance – levied since 1996 and supposed to 
amortise the insurance’s debt – should be levied until 2003. They also agreed on a sec-
ond solidarity contribution on higher incomes, to heighten the maximum insured in-
come and to make some specific benefit cutbacks (for details see Année Politique 
Suisse 1998: 272).  
Already in 1997, the economy started to recover and unemployment levels were fal-
ling (see appendix). Based primarily on a rather good economic situation as well as on 
several saving measures, the situation of the federal budget was getting better and better 
at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium.12 Still, from 2001 on-
wards, unemployment was rising again and in 2002, the federal deficit was again higher 
than in 2001 (Année Politique Suisse 2002: 119). As a consequence, more savings as 
well as expenditure containment programmes were, and still are, on the political 
agenda.13  
In 2000, a “mini” technical revision of unemployment insurance was voted by both 
chambers of parliament. But since the measures for reducing the debts of unemploy-
ment insurance – increased contributions to 3 percent and the additional solidarity con-
tributions on high incomes -- expired at the end of 2003 and the insurance had been in 
the black since 1999 (BSV 2002: 203), a more encompassing revision was put on the 
                                                 
12  For details see http://www.efd.admin.ch/d/dok/faktenblaetter/efd-schwerpunkte/101_auslege_finanzpol.htm, 
19.04.2005.  
13  For details see http://www.efd.admin.ch/d/dok/faktenblatter/efd-schwerpunkte/101_auslege_finazpol.htm, 
19.04.2005 and Année Politique Suisse (2003: 136-139).  
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 28) 
- 11 - 
federal agenda. The governmental draft of 2001 aimed at securing financing in the long-
run and at rendering the insurance less dependent on the business cycle (Année 
Politique Suisse 2000: 233). The federal government proposed a general contribution 
reduction but insisted on maintaining one of the two solidarity contributions on higher 
incomes. With regard to benefits, the minimum contribution period was doubled –- 
partly because of parallel bilateral agreements with the EU14 on the free movement of 
labour – and the maximum entitlement period was reduced, except for elderly employ-
ees and recipients of disability and accident insurance pensions. In order to retain a bal-
anced insurance budget over a business cycle, financing of regional employment agen-
cies and active labour market measures was to be modified (for details see Année 
Politique Suisse 2000: 233; Bonoli/Gay-des-Combes 2002: 35). In contrast to other 
regulations, the proposals on the solidarity contribution and the reduction of the maxi-
mum entitlement period incited vehement attacks from the social partners. In 2002, the 
two chambers of parliament finally reached a compromise. As to the debated solidarity 
contribution, a decision was made to abolish it for the time being, but then to oblige the 
federal government to levy it in case the unemployment insurance fund was facing a 
debt above 5 billion Francs (Année Politique Suisse 2002: 227). To accommodate left 
and labour unions’ opposition to the proposed reduction of the entitlement period – al-
ready threatening with a referendum –- the cantons were allowed to raise it temporarily 
for cantons or regions with high unemployment. However, a cantonal financial partici-
pation at 20 percent and a stronger temporal limitation of the period of prolonged bene-
fit receipt had been decided. On the initiative of the Federation for the Protection of the 
Unemployed (ADC)15, a referendum was launched by the most important trade union 
organisations, which refused benefit cutbacks. The voting campaign was not very fierce 
since positions had been clearly taken on the left-right scale and since the proposal was 
overshadowed by a much more polarising people’s initiative “against the misuse of asy-
lum” being voted on the same day (ibid.). In the popular vote, the revision was accepted 
by 56.1 percent of voters.  
On the whole, we find several reforms in unemployment insurance during the period 
under scrutiny, the two most important clearly being the creation of mandatory insur-
                                                 
14  Switzerland has concluded two bilateral agreements with the EU. The first (on the free movement of labour, 
research, public markets, technical trade barriers, transports and agriculture) was accepted by the people in 2000; 
the second (on the integration into the treaties of Schengen and Dublin) was accepted in June 2005. In 2005 as 
well, the people accepted on an extension of the agreement on the free movement of labour to the new EU-
member states. 
15  This advocacy group – residing in the canton of Neuchâtel – had already initiated the successful referendum 
against the restrictive revision of unemployment insurance in 1997.  
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ance in 1976 and the enhancement of active labour market policies in 1995. The direc-
tion of reforms shows a mixed picture. Generally, reforms have been balanced, combin-
ing restrictive with expansive measures. On the one hand, coverage was broadly ex-
panded and upbringing periods were taken into account for the calculation of the contri-
bution period. On the other hand, replacement rates were reduced and depend now on 
social criteria such as disability. Still, they remain generous in international comparison. 
Targeting was further strengthened as the duration of benefits was reduced, though also 
tied to social criteria such as age or disability. During the crisis of the 1990s, contribu-
tions had been steadily raised but they were lowered again when the economic situation 
relaxed at the beginning of the new millennium. The only clear retrenchment has failed 
in the popular vote in 1997.     
2.2. Health insurance 
Already since the mid-1960s, reforming voluntary health insurance had been an impor-
tant issue, but all attempts had failed (for details see Wyss/Lorenz 2000: 206). Reform 
was considered necessary, mainly because of ever increasing health costs, deficits run 
by health funds and the fact “that solidarity in health insurance had been gradually on 
the wane” (Maarse/Paulus 2003: 603). Since premiums were related to risk (gender and 
age at entry) in the enrolment procedure and insurance companies could even reject 
applicants (Armingeon 2003: 175) so-called bad risks could not easily change funds. 
What’s more, public subsidies did not increase solidarity for they were granted to the 
health funds, thereby benefiting all insured (Maarse/Paulus 2003: 604).  
Like other social programmes, health insurance was affected by the recession of the 
1970s. Back then, as a consequence of the federal budget deficit, the federal government 
massively reduced its contributions to health insurance (Année Politique Suisse 1983: 
141). Since several cantonal laws tied their own health insurance subsidies to federal 
ones, funds lost even more revenues (Année Politique Suisse 1989: 208). But since 
health costs rose at the same time, funds passed them onto the insured via higher premi-
ums. At the same time, the federal government heightened co-payments.  
A reform attempt was made in the 1980s with the aim of containing costs in the 
health sector and creating a universal maternity insurance.16 The governmental draft of 
1981, to this effect, was designed as an indirect counter-proposal to a feminist people’s 
initiative for maternity insurance launched in the 1970s (see below). The final parlia-
mentary solution tried to create a consensus by deciding important savings in health 
insurance (e.g. higher co-payments) and the creation of maternity insurance benefiting 
all mothers as well as higher state subsidies to health funds (Année Politique Suisse 
1987: 199-201). Two referendum committees attacked the proposal. First, the Swiss 
                                                 
16  As early as 1945, the Swiss constitution put the federal government in charge of creating a maternity insurance.  
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Federation of Trade criticised the creation of maternity insurance, while the second 
committee predominantly consisted of physicians and persons in charge of private hos-
pitals, fearing too much supervision of patients and physicians by health funds and the 
federal government (ibid: 201). Although the revision had been supported by the gov-
ernment and most parties, the sovereign clearly rejected it with 71.3 percent of votes. It 
was generally agreed that maternity insurance was crucial for the rejection (VOX 1987: 
19).  
Parliament still voted a temporarily limited federal decree in the 1980s which again 
increased federal subsidies to health funds. On this basis, the government was able to 
pass several minor reforms by the way of ordinances. This is how – among other meas-
ures – the federal government shifted its subsidies to the older generation, restricted the 
premium difference between the highest and lowest premiums within a fixed region and 
further extended co-payments – which had already been heightened in 1986 (Année 
Politique Suisse 1990: 226).  
The ill-fated revision of health insurance had been paralleled by two equally unsuc-
cessful people’s initiatives. The first – launched by the Swiss Concordat of Health 
Funds – had claimed higher state-subsidies, the second – put forward by Social Democ-
rats together with the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions – had proposed more radical 
changes such as a substitution of flat-rate premiums with income-related ones, new em-
ployers’ premiums, mandatory health insurance and higher state subsidies.  
When at the beginning of 1991 health funds threatened to raise premiums by on av-
erage 20 percent, the federal government decided that it was time to fight the permanent 
increase in health costs and the problem of different treatment of different risk groups in 
premiums, full mobility etc. Since an encompassing revision was thought as being a 
rather lengthy process, the federal government first acted through several temporary 
limited urgent federal decrees – as in unemployment insurance in the 1990s (see above). 
While the measures the federal government proposed to increase solidarity (e.g. higher 
federal subsidies to cantons to be used for premium reductions for low incomes, prohi-
bition of authorisation for new health funds, and a risk compensation system between 
health funds) were generally accepted in parliament, cost containment proved to be a 
much more problematic issue. The proposed (temporary) limitation of tariffs and prices 
for treatments, hospital stays and drugs in particular as well as of premiums was heavily 
debated. The final parliamentary compromise was a rather technical one: The proposal 
was split and the regulations on tariffs, prices and premiums were limited to one year, 
after which the federal government was to present a new draft, this time more in accor-
dance with cantonal interests. In 1992, the federal government presented this draft. It 
accommodated cantonal critics and relaxed limits on tariffs and prices in the hospital 
domain but (temporarily) froze tariffs and prices for the ambulant domain. The proposal 
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was however crucially altered in parliament. Most important were the creation of a gen-
eral co-payment for hospital treatments17 and the addition of exceptions as to when tar-
iffs are frozen in the ambulant domain. The decree was limited to the end of 1994, 
where an encompassing revision of health insurance was supposed to be accomplished. 
Because of the new co-payment for hospital treatments, a committee headed by the left 
Party of Labour launched a referendum. But since it found only the support of the right-
wing Lega di Ticino, the revision’s acceptance by more than 80 percent of voters in the 
popular vote was no surprise.  
Federal decrees were paralleled by work on a more encompassing reform of health 
insurance, again aiming at cost containment and more solidarity. The idea was also to 
adapt coverage of health insurance to the changing needs of the population (Bonoli 
1997: 116) via a moderate benefit enhancement. This revision clearly was the most im-
portant and radical change to health insurance in the period under scrutiny. A draft was 
presented by the federal government in 1991. It transferred most parts of the parallel 
federal decrees (e.g. higher federal subsidies for premium reductions to be supple-
mented with cantonal subsidies, abolition of discrimination based on gender, hospital 
co-payment) to ordinary legislation and added important new elements. Most important 
was the creation of mandatory insurance - including benefits in kind but not sick pay - 
for the resident population. Other central aspects were full mobility in basic insurance 
(without restriction, waiting time or financial loss), equal premiums in basic insurance – 
thereby abolishing all premium differences based on gender, age at entry or health con-
dition – and a prolongation of the (modified) risk equalisation between health funds. 
This compensation system – in combination with the obligation to contract (Theurl 
1999: 351) - was “intended to rule out competition in terms of risk selection and instead 
to promote competition in efficiency and degree of costumer choice” (Bonoli 1997: 
117). The draft also provided federal global budgeting and benefits in basic insurance 
were harmonised and expanded18 (Gerlinger 2003: 17). For further cost containment, 
alternative insurance models (like HMOs) and measures on hospital planning19 were put 
forward. Parliamentary decision-making proved to be a complicated and lengthy proc-
ess and in the end the conference of conciliation had to be set up between both cham-
bers. Remaining problematic issues were: measures on premium reductions (especially 
                                                 
17  Not applying to children, chronically ill persons and women in childbed.  
18  One of the most important additions to the benefit package is the “cover for services provided in nursing homes 
and by home nursing organisations (Spitex services)” (European Observatory on Health Care Systems 2000: 57). 
Additionally, hospital cost coverage was no longer temporarily limited.   
19  Cantons were obliged to develop hospital lists that name which hospitals will be reimbursed by health funds 
(Wyss/Lorenz 2000: 106).  
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the share of cantons in financing), federal global budgeting (only for the hospital or also 
for the ambulant domain) and whether the compensation between health funds was to be 
temporarily limited. The conference followed the Council of States on most points; an 
agreement was reached which then found large parliamentary support. As a conse-
quence, cantons were to afford 50 percent of federal subsidies for premium reductions 
(to take up the whole federal subsidy), global budgeting was again limited to the hospi-
tal domain and compensation between funds was only to take place for ten years. One 
last achievement for the National Council was to push through a new premium for gen-
eral health promotion and prevention. In 1994 four referendum committees – consisting 
of health funds and physicians – collected enough signatures for popular vote to take 
place. Opponents argued that the law was regulating too much, was too strongly ori-
ented towards orthodox medicine, not competitive enough and too expensive for the 
public purse as well as for the insured (Année Politique Suisse 1994: 224). The revision 
– supported by all governmental parties apart from the Swiss People’s Party – was ac-
cepted with a bare majority of about 52 percent of votes. Although about 98 percent of 
the population had been covered by health insurance (benefits in kind) before (European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems 2000: 77),  the “former option for the well-to-do 
to opt out was abolished by making health insurance mandatory to each Swiss citizen” 
(Maarse/Paulus 2003: 606). Equally important was that now all health funds have the 
obligation to contract (and without reservations). Finally, premiums can no longer vary 
according to age or gender. As a consequence of these modifications, Swiss health in-
surance has slightly moved away from private to social insurance.  
Quite contrary to what had been intended, health costs did not decrease after the revi-
sion of 1994 and instead rose further, as did premiums (for details see Gerlinger 2003: 
27-28). Additionally, federal government had again raised co-payments in 1997. Pre-
ceded by heated debates, another (less encompassing) revision of health insurance be-
came effective in 2001. One essential feature of the revision was that the federal gov-
ernment became entitled to make the authorisation of (new) physicians and other non-
medical providers -- in the ambulant domain and at the expense of mandatory health 
insurance – for a limited period dependent on demand. Again, federal subsidies for 
premium reductions were increased and premiums were lowered for those aged between 
18 and 25. For further cost containment, the federal government enacted or modified 
several ordinances, e.g. obligation to consult a physician of trust before certain treat-
ments and increased control of drug prices (Année Politique Suisse 2002: 223).  
Parallel to a more encompassing revision20 – which primarily focused on premium 
reductions, hospital funding21 and an abolition of the obligation to contract in the ambu-
                                                 
20  For details see Année Politique Suisse (2002: 225; 2003: 239-240).  
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lant domain but finally failed in parliament in 2003– the federal government enacted in 
2002 an urgent (and retroactive) federal decree on the financial participation of cantons 
in the hospital domain. It was a response to decisions of the Federal Insurance Court 
(EVK) which stated that cantons had to participate in the financing of mandatory bene-
fits in subsidised or public hospitals also for patients with supplementary insurances, a 
responsibility the cantons had denied until then. Against the parliamentary compromise 
– a stepwise introduction of full cantonal participation -- one health fund launched an 
(unsuccessful) referendum to have full cantonal participation implemented immediately. 
For lack of a more encompassing revision another federal decree had to be enacted in 
2003, aiming at securing the continuous payment of (again higher) federal subsidies to 
cantons for the reduction of premiums (Année Politique Suisse 2003: 237). In the same 
year by the way of an ordinance, the federal government expanded mandatory and op-
tional co-payments. Another change obliged health funds to take over the factual costs 
for care (in nursing homes and at home) in basic insurance instead of just subsidising 
these benefits (ibid: 207).22 
However, an encompassing revision was still seen as absolutely necessary. In 2004, 
the federal government presented a first reform package. It proposed to prolong the risk 
compensation system between health funds, a freeze of tariffs for care, and a prolonga-
tion of the urgent federal decree on hospital financing and the introduction of an insur-
ance card. Another aspect to be dealt with by parliament was again the obligation to 
contract.23 On the whole, the draft was mainly about prolonging expiring regulations. 
The Council of States followed the governmental proposal on all the main points and, 
because the debated abolition of the obligation to contract was not ripe for decision yet, 
supplemented it with the maintenance of the authorisation stop for new providers 
(ibid.). Here, the National Council followed the upper chamber of parliament and in the 
same year, the rather uncontroversial and unproblematic proposal was voted by parlia-
ment without a referendum being launched.  
Another revision focused on premium reductions for low incomes. This was a crucial 
issue as factual premium reductions differed importantly between cantons as it was their 
decision how much of the federal subsidy they wanted to use and supplement with can-
                                                                                                                                               
21  This issue is crucial because cantons act as financiers of public hospitals but their share in financing has been 
decreasing since the beginning of the 1990s, burdening health insurance and resulting in higher premiums (BSV 
2000).  
22  For further minor modifications see http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/as/2003/3249.pdf, 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/as/2004/3437.pdf, http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/as/2004/5075.pd  and 
fhttp://www.admin.ch/ch/d/as/2004/5401.pdf, all 04.05.2005.  
23  For details see http://www.parlament.ch/afs/data/d/rb/d_rb_20040031.htm, 04.05.2005.  
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tonal contributions. According to the proposal of the Council of States – finally ac-
cepted by the National Council in 2004 -- cantons have to reduce premiums for children 
and adolescents in training by at least 50 percent for families with low and medium in-
comes. The competency to set the income limits rests with the cantons.24 Additional 
costs are to a large extent to be covered by the federal government.  
At the moment, drafts on (higher) co-payments, the obligation to contract and a new 
financing system for long-term care are either treated by parliament or prepared by the 
federal government.  
Like the 1990s the new millennium witnessed a number of unsuccessful people’s ini-
tiative in health insurance. Two people’s initiatives had been launched by the retail dis-
tributor Denner. The first had proposed to decrease health costs by restricting manda-
tory insurance to hospital costs, the second had aimed at lower drug prices by proposing 
that funds reimbursed only the cheapest drugs and that drugs registered in countries 
adjacent to Switzerland should be automatically registered there as well (European Ob-
servatory on Health Care Systems 2000: 74). A Social Democratic initiative had pro-
posed to raise value-added tax in favour of health insurance and to replace per capita 
premiums by premiums related to income and real assets (Année Politique Suisse 2000: 
229). Several other initiatives on health insurance were launched but are still pending in 
2005.  
To sum up, one can say that Swiss health insurance has experienced important 
changes during the period under scrutiny. On the expansive side, what stands out is the 
creation of mandatory insurance (benefits in kind) with full mobility, benefit enhance-
ment, the substitution of general public subsidies with (higher) targeted subsidies to 
low-income groups and the abolition of premiums depending on gender, age at entry or 
state of health. On the other hand, co-payments – already high in international compari-
son – were further raised and rebates for optional (higher) co-payments reduced.  
2.3. Family policy  
Changes in federal family policy – although being an issue in the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s – have mainly taken place at the beginning of the new millennium. In contrast to 
health – and old age and survivors’ insurance (see below) – family policy did not wit-
ness a reduction of federal subsidies. Still, there was not that much to cut back. The sec-
ond half of the 1970s only witnessed a minor revision of federal family allowances in 
agriculture – increased coverage and income limits entitling to benefits (Année 
Politique Suisse 1979: 139) – as well as an (unsuccessful) people’s initiative for the 
creation of maternity insurance covering all treatment costs during motherhood. It had 
been launched by a feminist organisation and only found the support of Social Democ-
                                                 
24  For details see http://www.parlament.ch/afs/data/d/rb/d_rb_20040033.htm, 04.05.2005.  
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rats and parties of the extreme left. The proposed paternity leave easily served as a pre-
text for opposition (Année Politique Suisse 1984: 145). In 1984, more than 80 percent 
of voters rejected it, the main reasons being general opposition against the content or the 
initiators as well as opposition against parental leave (VOX 1984: 21). Like the 1970s, 
the 1980s saw a minor revision of federal family allowances in agriculture, bringing 
about a general benefit enhancement and a transfer of the competency for future benefit 
adjustment to the federal government (for details see Année Politique Suisse 1985: 151) 
as well as a tax reform which heightened child deductions (for details see Année 
Politique Suisse 1987: 213). In contrast, attempts to create a harmonising regulation on 
cantonal family allowances failed. The federal government did present a draft that pro-
posed such allowance for every child, i.e. independent of the parents’ professional 
status, and which it essentially based on a corresponding cantonal initiative (Lucerne). 
The draft met with strong opposition from most cantons, parties and all employers’ or-
ganisations. Finally, both chambers of parliament dismissed the initiative.25  
After another failure of maternity insurance as part of health insurance in 1987 (see 
above), the topic was put on the federal agenda again by a cantonal initiative (Genève) 
which had been voted by both chambers of parliament and which claimed the rapid in-
troduction of maternity insurance independent of health insurance. The final govern-
mental draft of 1997 included maternity insurance for all mothers. Reactions were rather 
mixed with especially bourgeois parties and employers attacking the proposal. Financ-
ing was the most problematic issue. Finally, parliament decided that funding was first to 
come from the important reserves of the existing Income Compensation System scheme 
for military service.26 Later on, value-added tax was to be modestly heightened. Parlia-
ment also decided to postpone the mandatory popular vote on increased value-added tax 
– necessary since it demanded constitutional change -- until 2000/2001 where popular 
votes were supposed to take place on the financing of old age and survivors’ as well as 
disability insurance. As had been announced during parliamentary debates, the conser-
vative Swiss People’s Party’s youth organisation launched a referendum. Since the peo-
ple were not able to vote on higher value-added tax before the insurance’s creation, it 
was attacked as a social insurance “on tick” (Année Politique Suisse 1999: 271). An-
other important argument was the extra cost for the public purse, resulting from the ad-
ditional tax financed basic benefit for low income mothers (NZZ 18.01.1999, cited 
from: Bonoli/Gay-des-Combes 2002: 26). The clear-cut popular rejection was even 
more surprising for support had been very strong among the political class of the 
                                                 
25  Unlike people’s initiatives, cantonal initiatives do not entail a popular vote when they are rejected by parliament.  
26  Supporters of this funding proposal argued on the basis of equity principles as women had paid contributions to 
the Income Compensation scheme since its creation but were not entitled to its benefits.  
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French-speaking part of Switzerland and more and more employers realised that the 
proposed insurance would rather disburden them as it would replace existing compensa-
tion regulations in collective labour agreements and labour law (Kriesi et al 1999: 34; 
Année Politique Suisse 1998: 271; 1999: 279).  
Nonetheless, the issue of maternity insurance was very soon on the federal agenda 
again. While the federal government had proposed a revision of labour law,27 individual 
members of all four governmental parties launched a parliamentary initiative in 2001 
which provided a maternity insurance for employed mothers only, with a replacement 
rate of 80 percent of former income during a leave period of 14 weeks. For financing, 
the Income Compensation scheme for military service was to be expanded, meaning 
financing by employers and employees. With its focus on employed mothers only, it 
was much more moderate than the 1999 version. It found strong approval inside and 
outside parliament, even among prior opponents of maternity insurance like the Federa-
tion of Trade28 or employers. As a consequence, the federal government dropped its own 
proposal for a maternity insurance as part of labour law. In 2003, the initiative’s pro-
posal was accepted by both chambers of parliament. Almost as could have been ex-
pected, a cross-party committee headed by the conservative Swiss People’s Party 
launched a referendum. According to the Swiss People’s Party, the constitutional obli-
gation to create a federal maternity insurance was already fulfilled by benefits of health 
insurance, and a further expansion of Swiss social insurances would be irresponsible 
with regard to the financial situation of other branches of social provision, especially 
old age and disability insurance. And additionally there was the fear of higher contribu-
tions in the future. Nonetheless, the proposal was accepted by a narrow majority of vot-
ers in 2004 and Switzerland finally got a maternity insurance, although a rather modest 
one. In contrast to the unsuccessful proposal of 1999, this one had also found the sup-
port of voters in small and middle-sized cities in the German-speaking part of Switzer-
land, where a change of tendency had taken place, thereby allowing the adoption of ma-
ternity insurance (Allenspach/Kopp/Milic 2004: 35).  
After the cantonal initiative (Lucerne) for a federal regulation of family allowances 
had failed in the 1980s, the topic was brought again on the federal agenda by a Social 
Democratic parliamentary initiative at the beginning of the 1990s. Based on the initia-
tive, the responsible committee of the National Council developed a draft. The pivotal 
idea was the creation of a universal (and relatively generous) child allowances. How-
ever, opponents outweighed supporters of the proposal (Jaggi 2000: 212). One argument 
of the opponents was that cantonal regulations were satisfying and that cantons were 
                                                 
27  Maternity pay imposed on employers for a period of eight to twelve weeks (Bonoli/Gay-des-Combes 2002: 27).  
28  In fact, its director was among the initiators of the parliamentary initiative.  
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 28) 
- 20 - 
generally more apt to deal with issues of family policy (Stalder 1996: 261). As a conse-
quence, the committee developed a more moderate proposal: a framework law, setting 
minimum standards but leaving cantonal competencies for family allowances largely 
untouched (Jaggi 2000: 211). Benefits were also to be granted to self-employed and 
non-employed parents (the latter case only happening in a few cantons), but cantons 
would only have to grant them up to an income limit they set themselves. The (again 
modified) draft is at the moment being discussed in parliament, while an alternative 
people’s initiative – launched by the labour union Travail.Suisse in 2003 for universal 
and more generous federal family allowances (Année Politique Suisse 2003: 252) – has 
not been decided on by the people yet. It should be noted that its high costs make a re-
jection rather likely.   
Apart from family allowances, other family policy proposals are on the federal 
agenda but so far have not been decided on either. In 2001, two parliamentary initiatives 
for supplementary benefits for low income families were voted by the National Council. 
These benefits are supposed to fight family poverty (Année Politique Suisse 2001: 209). 
The National Council is currently developing a corresponding draft to be presented in 
2005.  
While decisions still have to be taken with regard to federal family allowances and 
supplementary benefits for low income families, a Social Democratic parliamentary 
initiative for temporarily limited federal subsidies for the creation of new day care fa-
cilities was successful. It is based on a new federal support competency in family policy 
(Art. 116 paragraph 1 Federal Constitution), resulting in its turn from an encompassing 
constitutional revision in the 1990s (for details see EDI 2004: 113-114). Since pre-
school and elementary school facilities are regulated at the cantonal and municipal 
level, the federal government only provides a global credit of 200 million Francs until 
2006. However, in the face of the problematic federal budget, federal subsidies are 
lower and provided for a shorter period than proposed by the initiative. An attempt to 
massively reduce federal subsidies and to end the programme earlier than scheduled 
could be fended off by the political left together with the Christian Democrats (for de-
tails see Année Politique Suisse 2003: 253).  
A tax reform – which amongst other things aimed at disburdening families via higher 
deductions for children and new day care deductions for working parents – failed in an 
optional referendum in 2004. The referendum had been launched by left and green par-
ties as well as by eleven cantons with the so-called cantonal referendum.29 Other aspects 
                                                 
29  This was the first time in the Swiss history that the cantonal referendum was launched against a parliamentary 
proposal. Through the cantonal referendum, eight cantons can enforce a popular vote on a parliamentary law or 
decree.  
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of the encompassing reform package – such as proprietary tax or the stamp duty – had 
been at least equally contended as those on families but opposition against measures on 
the taxation of families was mainly based on its perception as benefiting the rich (Engeli 
2004: 25).  
Overall, federal family policy is a field of clear expansion, although starting from a 
level of social protection quite low in international comparison. The most important 
change was undoubtedly the creation of a (modest) maternity insurance, followed by the 
federal subsidies for new child care facilities. Federal family allowances in agriculture, 
too, have been enhanced during the period under scrutiny.  
2.4. Pensions  
Against the background of the federal deficit – a problem as early as the 1960s – and its 
aggravation in the recession of the 1970s, parliament in 1975 accepted a temporarily 
limited governmental proposal to reduce federal subsidies to universal old age and sur-
vivors’ insurance (AHV). Also benefits were modestly raised to make up for price in-
creases. The reduction of federal subsidies resulted in the first deficit of the AHV com-
pensation fund (Année Politique Suisse 1976: 132), which led to another revision. The 
governmental reform objective was twofold: financial consolidation both by increasing 
certain revenues (primarily new contributions for employed pensioners, higher contribu-
tions for the self-employed) and by reducing some outlays (especially by raising 
women’s entitlement age for the couples’ pensions and the supplementary pensions for 
spouses) as well as the maintenance of benefit value by a new indexation mechanism 
which kept pensions in line with a mixed index of price and wage developments. The 
reform also included a stepwise rise of federal subsidies, which were to reach their for-
mer level in 1982. Although the proposal was not uncontroversial, both chambers of 
parliament did not want to endanger its compromise character and voted it with only 
minor modifications. The first referendum ever against a revision of public old age and 
survivors’ insurance was launched by the most conservative wing of the political right, 
opposing nearly every aspect of the revision, apart from those reducing outlays. Still in 
1978, the revision was accepted by two out of three citizens in the popular vote, with 
the most important argument for those voting in favour being the financial recovery of 
the AHV (VOX 1978: 7). In contrast, a people’s initiative which had been launched by 
the extreme left and asked for a lower retirement age was rejected on the same day. An 
analogous left initiative - proposing a retirement age of 62 for men and 60 for women - 
was rejected by the people in 1988 after having found only the support of some small 
left parties.  
In the 1990s, the public pension scheme was subject to the most important revision 
of the period under scrutiny. Making the AHV more women-friendly – the main points 
of critique were the connection of benefits with civil status (mainly through the so-
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called couples’ pensions30) and the lack of provision for informal care – had been on the 
political agenda since the end of the 1970s. Proposals therefore focused on a reform of 
the status of women in the AHV as well as on a flexible retirement age. The revision 
was supposed to remain cost-neutral (no increase of contributions or public subsidies). 
However, governmental proposals were strongly debated on from the start. In the face 
of important political polarisation, the revision could not be realised in the 1980s (An-
née Politique Suisse 1985: 9). Finally, in 1990 the federal government presented a 
modified reform proposal, no longer aiming at a cost-neutral reform as this requirement 
seemed to block progress towards real gender equality (Bonoli/Gay-des-Combes 2002: 
13). With regard to the latter, the draft proposed punctual ameliorations for women and 
a new widower’s pension for those with underage children. Early retirement was pro-
posed with a corresponding benefit decrease. Finally, benefits should rise for beneficiar-
ies with low income thanks to a new pension formula. The main way of financing ex-
pansive measures was to raise the contributions for the self-employed. Disappointment 
of women’s organisations and progressive groups was important, as the draft was seen 
as only putting forward “the minimum requirements needed in order to comply with the 
constitutional article on gender equality” (Bonoli 1997: 119-120). While the Council of 
States accepted the proposal without important modifications, things did not go that 
smoothly in the National Council. In the face of dissatisfaction with the governmental 
proposal, regarding mainly the equal treatment of men and women, the lower chamber’s 
committee set up a board which was to develop a splitting-model and credits for care 
and upbringing. With regard to uncontested measures (e.g. new pension formula, sepa-
rate payment of couples’ pensions, amelioration of the situation of divorced women, 
higher federal subsidies) both chambers of parliament agreed to pre-draw them in a fed-
eral decree which became effective in 1993. In the same year, the National Council 
voted the second and more important part of the revision, based on the board’s propos-
als. The main points were a splitting of couples’ pensions entitlements (thereby abolish-
ing the couples’ pensions), contribution credits for informal care and a widowers’ pen-
sion for those with underage children. Conversely, the right-of centre parliamentary 
majority had been able to push through a stepwise rise in women’s retirement age to 64 
(Bonoli 1997: 121; Bonoli/Gay-des-Combes 2002: 14) which then was a crucial issue in 
the Council of States. In 1994, a parliamentary compromise was eventually reached on 
the basis of the National Council’s proposal. The final law also overtook nearly all 
measures of the preceding federal decree and allowed early retirement, but with a pro-
portional benefit decrease. The biggest labour unions decided to launch a referendum, as 
                                                 
30  Pensions for couples were calculated on the basis of the husband’s contribution record, unless the wife was enti-
tled to a higher benefit (Obinger et al 2005: 288).  
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the rise in women’s retirement age was in complete opposition with their claim for a 
general lowering of retirement ages (Bonoli 1999: 66). The situation was problematic 
for labour unions, left parties and women’s organisations since in Switzerland referenda 
can only decide between the adoption and the rejection of a law, and cannot modify its 
content. On the one hand, these groups clearly opposed a higher retirement age for 
women, and on the other hand they had been fighting for more gender equality in the 
AHV for a long time. Consequently, labour unions supplemented their referendum with 
a people’s initiative “for the revision without a raise in the retirement age”. In spite of 
the referendum, the revision was accepted by about 60 percent of voters in 1995: a 
stronger approval than had been expected (Année Politique Suisse 1995: 245). In con-
trast, the people’s initiative failed in 1998. Another people’s initiative – launched by 
Social Democrats and the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions – had already been dis-
missed in 1995. The main idea had been to enable public pensions to really secure sub-
sistence of retirees, also lower retirement age was put forward by the initiative. As with 
the last two people’s initiatives for lower retirement age (1978 and 1988, see above), 
financial objections had been crucial for the initiative’s failure (Serdült 1995: 15).  
The combination of the federal budget deficit with about 800 million Francs addi-
tional costs resulting from the revision of the 1990s (Obinger 1998b: 78) also made old 
age and survivors’ insurance a target of saving measures. In 1994, parliament accepted a 
reduction of federal subsidies to AHV by 0.5 percentage points. Further saving meas-
ures were turned down (ibid: 52). In 1995, barely noticed by the public, the revised law 
on federal taxes became effective which amongst other things made AHV-benefits en-
tirely taxable instead of only 80 percent of the benefit, as before (Année Politique 
Suisse 1995: 245). Additionally, in 1996 parliament allowed the federal government to 
skip the yearly supplementary federal contribution as scheduled by the 1994 revision 
until 2002. This contribution had been created in order to compensate the surplus costs 
resulting from the creation of a more flexible retirement age. However the possibility to 
retire early was not to be affected (Année Politique Suisse 1996: 256).  
Apart from savings measures, the government also sought to increase revenues for 
the AHV. A mobilisation of an additional percentage of value-added tax for AHV - ac-
cepted by the people in 1993 - was proposed by the federal government in 1997 and 
soon voted by parliament. And in 1998, parliament voted a law on taxes on gambling 
houses, and had these new taxes flow into the AHV compensation fund (Année 
Politique Suisse 1998: 115). Finally, the federal government decided that parts of the 
scheduled cantonal contributions to the reorganisation of federal finances (500 million 
Francs in total) were to take the form of higher subsidies to the AHV (ibid: 156-157).  
Already since 1994 the federal government had been preparing another encompass-
ing revision of old age and survivors’ insurance which was to focus on its financial con-
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solidation in the long-run and on flexible retirement age. Compared to its predecessors, 
the final parliamentary compromise of 2003 was rather restrictive, especially for women 
who were supposed to bear the main burden for the financial consolidation of the AHV 
(lower widows’ benefits and higher retirement age). Social Democrats together with 
several labour unions decided to launch a referendum, arguing amongst other things that 
the cutbacks disadvantaged women, although the main reason for the referendum was 
that the bourgeois parliamentary majority had dropped the regulations favouring lower 
incomes in early retirement (Année Politique Suisse 2003: 228). Although preceding 
opinion polls had hinted at a failure of the revision in the popular vote, the extent and 
homogeneity of rejection was nonetheless impressive (for details see NZZ Online, 
17.05.2004). This is the first time a revision of the public pension scheme has been re-
jected by the people.  
Another increase of value-added tax on behalf of AHV - presented in a separate draft 
and subject to mandatory referendum since it demanded constitutional change - was also 
clearly defeated at the polls. It had been strongly opposed by Liberals and Conserva-
tives, business and employers’ associations, who all feared negative consequences for 
the Swiss economy (Engeli 2004: 18).  
After retrenching old age pensions via a general revision had failed, the public 
scheme was still subject to cutbacks owing to general saving measures. In 2003, the 
special federal contribution for flexible retirement age – part of the revision of 1994 – 
was abolished and the contribution made for 2003 was compensated by a reduction of 
federal subsidies to the AHV for 2005 and 2006 (Année Politique Suisse 2003: 225).  
Another governmental proposal – taking up important elements of the ill-fated revi-
sion of 2003 but supplementing it with an early retirement benefit – has not yet been 
treated by parliament (for details see BSV 2005).  
Like the 1990s, the new millennium has already witnessed the failure of several peo-
ple’s initiative on AHV in a popular vote. Two of them, by employees’ associations and 
by the Greens, aimed at reversing the raise in women’s retirement age as decided in 
1994 and combined it with other measures for a lower, uniform and more flexible re-
tirement age. Equally unsuccessful was a people’s initiative from the conservative 
Swiss People’s Party, wishing to transfer current and future surplus National Bank gold 
reserves - no longer needed for monetary policy - to the AHV fund.31  
 
                                                 
31  The counter-proposal of government and parliament was rejected as well. It had proposed to transfer the proceeds 
of the surplus gold reserves to a fund, while the fund’s returns should be granted in equal shares to the AHV, can-
tons and a solidarity foundation (for details see Mahnig/Milic 2002).  
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 28) 
- 25 - 
Occupational benefits as a second pillar of old age protection – with the public old age 
and survivors’ insurance being the first, private provision the third pillar32 - had already 
been playing an important role in the Swiss pension scheme before the 1970s.33 It was 
even more so from the 1980s: Its legal anchoring in 1985 and especially its mandatory 
character not only meant an important expansion of the federal state’s role in Swiss so-
cial policy – as occupational provision used to depend on the voluntarism of employers 
- but also a shift from the principle of minimum protection to status preservation. The 
legal change of the 1980s was based on a constitutional revision from the 1970s, where 
the so-called three-pillar-model had won over an enlargement of the public old age and 
survivors’ insurance as favoured by the political left. Constitutional change had been 
accepted by the people in 1972 while on the same day a challenging people’s initiative 
of the left Party of Labour for an expansion of the public AHV was defeated. However, 
developing the implementing legislation proved to be a difficult – and hence lengthy – 
process. Problematic issues were the primacy of contributions or benefits, the financing 
system, the treatment of different generations and the adaptation of benefits to the de-
velopment of prices. In the face of the rather difficult economic situation at the time of 
governmental and parliamentary debates, bourgeois parties successfully pushed through 
a more moderate version than promised at the time of the constitutional revision. 
Mainly by opting for the primacy of contributions, the constitutional aim of 1972 – a 
continuation of the accustomed standard of living in combination with public old age 
and survivors’ insurance – was abandoned for the time being (Tschudi 1993: 13). The 
resulting occupational benefit plan was a fully funded scheme. It was only mandatory 
for employees above a certain income level and was supplied for by private and public 
funds. Financing was solely via contributions of employers and employees.  
The very complex law on occupational benefits was soon to cause dissatisfaction and 
implementation problems, making several adaptations necessary. The expansion of full 
mobility turned out to be the main problem as it was much debated on, and legislators 
could feel the pressure through a people’s initiative, launched by the Swiss Society of 
Commercial Clerks (SKV). Parliament in 1993 agreed on full mobility, though with 
benefits of exit differentiated according to the age of employees and pension funds be-
ing allowed to modify the technical interest rate - which is crucial for the calculation of 
both benefits of exit and entry - by one percent (for details see Année Politique Suisse 
                                                 
32  Non-compulsory private provision encouraged by tax-concessions (third pillar) has experienced no major modifi-
cations throughout the period under scrutiny.  
33  The most important reasons were the late creation of a public pension scheme (1946) and the fact that until the 
1970s public old age benefits had not reached their constitutional aim of securing subsistence.  
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1992: 231-232). Rather satisfied with this final parliamentary proposal, the SKV with-
drew its initiative.  
Although occupational benefits witnessed no encompassing revision in the 1990s, 
they were further affected by other reforms. First, as a result of a change in unemploy-
ment insurance, recipients of unemployment insurance benefits became insured in oc-
cupational benefits against the risks of death and disability, which meant that an impor-
tant gap in the Swiss social insurance system was finally filled (Obinger 1998b: 91). In 
order to finance these benefits, parliament had proposed a general reduction of unem-
ployment insurance benefits. Yet, this proposition had failed in the referendum of 1997 
(see above). Secondly, part of accumulated capital can now be pre-drawn in order to 
amortise mortgages for houses and flats, while the other benefits are reduced accord-
ingly.   
Parallel to the unsuccessful revision of the public old age and survivors’ insurance of 
2003 (see above), occupational benefits were revised at the beginning of the new mil-
lennium. The main reform objective was to adapt the system to higher life expectancy 
(Bonoli/Gay-des-Combes 2002: 18). Based on reactions to a first draft, the governmen-
tal proposal of 2000 only focused on coordination with the regulations of the parallel 
revision of the AHV – equal retirement age for men and women (65), a more flexible 
retirement age and the creation of a widowers’ benefit – and the financial consolidation 
of mandatory insurance. For saving reasons, the minimum conversion rate - used to 
convert individual savings into annual pensions – was to be reduced, while the initial 
idea of increased coverage of part-time workers and lower incomes was dropped from 
the proposal (Année Politique Suisse 1999: 273). Unlike the federal government, the 
responsible committee of the National Council opted for more far-reaching changes by 
reviving the idea of increased coverage for part-time workers and workers with low 
income. This, as well as the decrease of the minimum conversion rate, proved to be the 
most debated proposals, but eventually a parliamentary compromise was reached in 
2003. The final (rather balanced) law combined equal retirement age for men and 
women (65) and a lower minimum conversion rate with a new widowers’ benefit and a 
lower minimum income needed for mandatory insurance.34  
In 2003, occupational benefits were subject to pure retrenchment when the federal 
government for the first time lowered the minimum interest rate in mandatory occupa-
tional benefits. Although the federal government is legally entitled to do so by the way 
of ordinances and a lower rate was seen as necessary by most political actors in the face 
                                                 
34  Another – rather technical – revision was voted by parliament in 2004. To tackle the serious problem of insurers’ 
underfunding, it expanded the scope of action for insurers and extended the catalogue of possible measures to end 
underfunding (for details see Année Politique Suisse 2003: 230).  
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of the stock market slump of 2001 and 2002, this sudden and arbitrary move was criti-
cised. What’s more, federal government in 2005 increased early retirement age in occu-
pational benefits from 55 to 58 years.   
 
Means-tested supplementary benefits for recipients of public old age and survivors’ in-
surance (as well as disability insurance) benefits were subject to reform in the 1980s and 
1990s. A first revision reduced federal subsidies to means-tested supplementary benefits 
in the 1980s (Année Politique Suisse 1984: 29) while all public subsidies to old age and 
survivors’ insurance (and disability insurance) were now to be federal only (ibid.). 
Since everyday experience as well as research had demonstrated that supplementary 
benefits rested in many cases far away from their legally fixed objective of covering the 
costs of living (ibid: 142), the federal government proposed another draft in 1984, fo-
cusing on selective benefit enhancement. Put shortly, the rather balanced revision re-
sulted in higher deductions, especially for recipients living in homes, paying high rents 
and for those cared for at home. But the revision also brought about a stronger asset-
testing and a more pronounced accounting for pension fund benefits (Année Politique 
Suisse 1986: 164).  
In 1995, the federal government presented another reform proposal which essentially 
aimed at ameliorating the situation of pensioners living at home through higher com-
pensations for housing costs. At the same time, waiting periods for foreigners living in 
Switzerland were to be reduced and pensioners should be more easily informed about 
their entitlements to supplementary benefits. Even if it was clear that the revision would 
result in additional costs, reactions were rather positive. Since several cantons had 
claimed a stronger federal involvement in financing, an important part of the surplus 
load was granted to the federal government (for details see Année Politique Suisse 
1996: 256-257).  
Just as the other set of policies presented in this paper, the Swiss pension scheme has 
experienced important changes during the period under scrutiny. As regarding public 
old age and survivors’ insurance, reforms have been balanced. They were expansive, 
with the splitting of pensions and contribution credits for informal care as well as the 
new pension formula favouring lower income groups, but also brought cutbacks, impor-
tant examples of which are the rise in women’s retirement age and the reduction of fed-
eral subsidies. The creation and the mandatory character of occupational benefits consti-
tute an important expansion of the Swiss welfare state. Later on, we do find the same 
pattern of balanced reforms as in public old age survivors’ insurance. Finally, also sup-
plementary benefits experienced enhancing and retrenching changes, but generally the 
trend is rather expansive.   
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3. Comparative perspective  
The questions posed in this paper were whether Switzerland is still expanding its social 
programmes after the so-called golden age and whether the direction of change varies 
over the core programmes of the welfare state. When we look at social spending, it is 
obvious that the Swiss welfare state is not retreating. With regard to qualitative evi-
dence, the picture gets more complex. Family policy is a field of clear and important 
expansion, especially through the creation of an entirely new social programme, mater-
nity insurance. Also, federal family allowances in agriculture have been enhanced dur-
ing the period under scrutiny and the federal government now subsidises child care fa-
cilities. No retrenchment has taken place in family policy, but since Switzerland was a 
clear laggard in this domain there was not much to cut back. Another social programme 
which expanded during the period under scrutiny is means-tested supplementary bene-
fits for low income pensioners of old age and survivors’ insurance (as well as disability 
insurance). For the other welfare state domains, the trend is less clear-cut. In unemploy-
ment insurance, reforms have been rather balanced, combining restrictive with expan-
sive measures. On the one hand, coverage has been enhanced by making the insurance 
mandatory for all wage earners and upbringing periods are now taken into account for 
the calculation of the contribution period. One the other hand, benefits have been re-
duced for many beneficiaries and contributions have risen steadily during the crisis of 
the 1990s (but were recently lowered again). The same pattern of reform applies to 
health insurance. What stands out on the expansive side is the creation of mandatory 
insurance (benefits in kind) with full mobility, the enhancement of benefits to be cov-
ered by mandatory insurance, the abolition of premiums depending on gender, age at 
entry or state of health as well as the substitution of general public subsidies to health 
funds with (higher) targeted subsidies to low-income groups. In contrast, co-payments – 
which were already high in international comparison – were further raised during the 
period under scrutiny. In public old age and survivors’ insurance, reforms have been 
balanced as well: While the insurance now knows a splitting of pensions, contribution 
credits for informal care as well as a new pension formula favouring low-income 
groups, cutbacks have also taken place. Examples include the higher retirement age for 
women and a reduction of federal subsidies. The creation and the mandatory character 
of occupational benefits were an important expansion of the Swiss welfare state, by 
increasing their coverage and benefits. Later on, the already familiar pattern of balanced 
reforms can be found in occupational benefits as well: equal retirement ages for men 
and women and a lower minimum conversion rate on the one side, a new widowers’ 
benefit and a lower minimum income needed for mandatory insurance on the other.  
On balance Switzerland has clearly expanded its welfare state, thereby catching up 
with more advanced western welfare states, by increased coverage (unemployment in-
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surance, health insurance and occupational benefits), higher benefits (especially in fam-
ily allowances, health insurance and supplementary benefits) as well as the creation of 
new social programmes, such as maternity insurance or federal subsidies for child care. 
What’s more, we even find an expansion of the federal state’s role in Swiss social pol-
icy – in contrast to devolution of social responsibilities or supranational standard setting 
- in unemployment and health insurance as well as in occupational benefits.  
4. Conclusion  
The expansion of the Swiss welfare state after the end of the golden age clearly warrants 
an explanation, attempts at which will be made here. As the description of Swiss wel-
fare state development has already made clear, institutions and more specifically direct 
democracy have crucially shaped the pattern of reform, in that reform packages com-
bined expansion with cutbacks.  
Two instruments of direct democracy – the optional referendum and the people’s ini-
tiative – were of particular importance. Problem pressure – such as increased unem-
ployment levels, federal deficits, financial problems of the unemployment and pension 
schemes as well as rising costs and declining solidarity in health insurance – made it 
necessary for the federal government and parliament to seek legislative solutions that 
would not straight away be overthrown by optional referenda. This meant, therefore, 
minimising the risk of a referendum by accommodating the interests of the various po-
litical actors capable of preventing legislative change. Consequently, most reforms bal-
anced the interests of those arguing for a further expansion of the Swiss welfare state – 
mainly left parties and labour unions – and of those in favour of retrenchment and of the 
status quo, among others the Liberals, the conservative Swiss People’s Party and em-
ployers. Finally, cantonal interests and lobby groups had of course to be taken into ac-
count. Revisions which did not meet the logic of consensus-building frequently failed in 
optional referenda.  
People’s initiatives often put pro-welfare issues on the federal agenda. Although 
none of the many people’s initiatives analysed here was eventually accepted in a popu-
lar vote (see also table 4 in the appendix)35 some have had expansive indirect effects, 
mainly through governmental or parliamentary counter-proposals which accommodated 
some of the initiators’ interests. One example is the initiative of the Swiss Society of 
Commercial Clerks on full mobility in occupational benefits, which was withdrawn as 
the initiators were satisfied with the (indirect) parliamentary counter-proposal. Another 
one is the modernisation of social insurances, which was furthered by the constitutional 
article on equal treatment (1981), itself an indirect counter-proposal to a people’s initia-
                                                 
35  Still, the chance of success for a people’s initiative in Switzerland generally rates at only 10 percent (Linder 
1999: 259).  
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tive. Put simply, while the optional referendum seems to have moderated both re-
trenchment and expansion, the people’s initiative has to some extent furthered pro-
welfare issues.  
Pure retrenchment measures were also to be found – such as the reduction of federal 
subsidies to health and old age and survivors’ insurance in the 1970s or the increase of 
co-payments in health insurance or the reduction of the minimum interest rate in occu-
pational benefits. While the former example is rather difficult to account for – and will 
therefore have to be analysed in more detail in future research - the latter two cutbacks 
came through ordinances, which are not subject to referendum, and not through ordi-
nary legislation. Still, it would be mislead to conclude there is a loop-hole for easy re-
trenchment since such exclusive governmental competencies are extremely rare.  
Partisan influence on Swiss welfare state reforms is rather difficult to disentangle. 
Since the federal government consists of the four major parties and little is known about 
its decision-making process, partisan influence has to be looked for in other political 
arenas. While its impact can be seen while looking at direct democracy – some success-
ful left-wing referenda in defence of the welfare state are examples of that - direct de-
mocracy is really the main playing field of other political actors, such as social partners 
or lobby groups. Partisan effects can also be found in parliament, where the National 
Council, in some important cases, proved to be much more in favour of expansive poli-
cies than the Council of States – e.g. for the enhancement of activation in unemploy-
ment insurance and for gender equality in old age and survivors’ insurance. The reason 
might be that in the lower chamber of parliament, left parties are better represented.36 
Finally, for family policy – the clearest example of welfare state expansion – one 
crucial factor is the convergence of aims between three of the four dominant parties 
(Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Liberals) (EDI 2004: 137). While Social 
and Christian Democrats have for a long time been advocating an expansion of federal 
family policy, the Liberals have had an ever increasing interest in – mainly - reconciling 
work and family life. The growing shortage of labour and the strong political resistance 
against increased immigration in Switzerland were some of the reasons why employers, 
too, realised the importance of conciliating work and family life (Bonoli/Gay-des-
Combes 2002: 28). So while problem pressure clearly provided important incentives for 
reform, institutions and political parties mattered at least just as much for recent welfare 
state changes in Switzerland.  
Finally, it would be misleading to explain the increase of social expenditure in Swit-
zerland by policy-decisions alone. Other important factors are situated on the demand 
side of the welfare state, especially the changing demographic composition of the Swiss 
                                                 
36  For an explanation of the under-representation of left parties in the upper chamber see Linder (1999: 95-96).  
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population (increasing numbers of citizens aged 65 or over) and rising unemployment. 
Last but not least, the growth in Swiss social expenditure is in part due simply to the 
way it is calculated: Economic growth rates – i.e. the change in the denominator of wel-
fare effort – directly affect social expenditure. Therefore, rising social expenditure in 
Switzerland is partly a result of low economic growth (especially since the 1990s), “i.e. 
no or weak increases in the denominator” (Armingeon 1998: 107).  
Put shortly, quantitative as well as qualitative evidence show that Switzerland has 
expanded its welfare state after the end of the so-called golden age. With regard to the 
postulated convergence of modern welfare states towards a residual model Switzerland 
is not a case in point and thereby adds to the already existing evidence against the “race 
to the bottom” thesis. The existence of direct democracy has prevented a systematic 
“race to the bottom” (and is likely to do so in the future). The country has rather caught 
up to the top, with both expenditure as well as specific designs of social programmes 
(e.g. mandatory insurances, maternity benefits) resembling more and more those of the 
“mainstream” Continental and Northern-European welfare states.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 1:  Unemployment rates in the period under scrutiny: Switzerland and the 
OECD compared  
Year CH OECD average  
1975 0.4 3.8 
1976 0.7 4.3 
1977 0.4 4.6 
1978 0.3 5.0 
1979 0.3 4.8 
1980 0.2 5.2 
1981 0.2 6.4 
1982 0.4 7.6 
1983 0.9 8.6 
1984 1.1 8.5 
1985 0.9 8.2 
1986 0.8 8.0 
1987 0.7 7.7 
1988 0.6 7.4 
1989 0.5 7.0 
1990 0.5 6.8 
1991 1.8 7.8 
1992 2.8 8.7 
1993 3.8 9.7 
1994 3.7 9.6 
1995 3.3 9.0 
1996 3.7 9.0 
1997 4.1 8.6 
1998 3.4 7.9 
1999 2.9 7.2 
2000 2.6 6.6 
2001 2.5 6.2 
2002 3.0 6.5 
2003 4.0 6.8 
Note: Unemployment rates as a percentage of total labour force; Source: OECD (1994; 2004).  
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Table 2:  Major legislative changes in the period under scrutiny  
Unemployment insurance  
1976 Mandatory insurance, new employers’ contributions  
1995 Enhanced active labour market policies, benefit reductions (depending on social criteria), upbringing taken into account for the calculation of the contribution period  
Health insurance 
1994 Mandatory insurance (benefits in kind) with full mobility, equal premiums, benefit en-hancement, (higher) targeted state subsidies to low-income groups, higher co-payments  
2004 New system of premium reductions for low and medium income families  
Family policy 
2002 Federal subsidies for new child care facilities  
2003 New maternity insurance for employed mothers 
Pensions 
Old age and survivors’ insurance 
1994 Splitting of pensions, provision for informal care, higher women’s retirement age, new pension formula favouring lower income groups  
Occupational benefits 
1985 Mandatory insurance (above a certain income level) 
2003 Equal retirement age for men and women, lower minimum conversion rate, increased coverage  
Supplementary benefits 
1997 Higher compensation for housing costs, measures to increase take-up   
Note: Own compilation.  
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Table 3:  Optional referenda in the period under scrutiny 
Unemployment insurance 
Year Opposed measures  Successful 
1993 Lower compensation rate, tighter definition of adequate work   
1997 Benefit reductions  X 
2002  Higher minimum contribution period, shorter entitlement period for em-ployees below the age of 55   
Health insurance 
Year Opposed measures  Successful 
1987 Creation of a universal maternity insurance, more supervision of patients and physicians  X 
1993  New co-payment for hospital treatments   
1994  Increased regulation, favouring of orthodox medicine, insufficient compe-tition and too high costs   
2003  Delayed introduction of full cantonal participation in the financing of mandatory benefits for patients with supplementary insurances   
Family policy  
Year Opposed measures  Successful 
1987 Creation of a universal maternity insurance X 
1999 Creation of a universal maternity insurance  X 
2004  Creation of maternity insurance, further expansion of the Swiss welfare state, possibility of higher contributions in the future    
Pensions  
Year Opposed measures  Successful 
1978 
New premiums for employed pensioners, higher premiums for the self-
employed, the new mixed index for the adaptation of benefits and its 
corollary, the increase of federal subsidies in the AHV 
 
1995 Higher retirement age for women in the AHV  
2004 Cutbacks at the disadvantage of women, lack of regulations favouring lower incomes in early retirement in the AHV X 
Note: Own compilation.  
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Table 4:  People’s initiatives in the period under scrutiny* 
Health insurance 
Year Proposed measures  
1992 Higher state-subsidies, limitation of tariffs for medical treatments  
1994  Substitution of flat-rate premiums with income-related ones, employers’ premiums, manda-tory insurance, higher federal subsidies  
2000 Restriction of mandatory insurance to hospital costs  
2001  Reimbursement of the cheapest drugs only, parallel imports  
2003  Increase of value-added tax for health insurance, substitution of flat-rate premiums with premiums related to income, real assets and family situation 
Family policy 
Year Proposed measures  
1984 Maternity insurance covering all treatment costs during motherhood  
Pensions 
Year Proposed measures  
1978 Lower retirement age of 60 in the AHV  
1988 Lower retirement age of 62 for men and 60 for women in the AHV 
1995 Enable AHV to secure subsistence of retirees, flexible retirement age of 62  
1998 AHV-revision of 1994 without higher retirement age for women  
2000 Two parallel initiatives for lower, uniform and more flexible retirement age in the AHV 
2001 Creation of an ecological tax to finance lower retirement age in the AHV 
2002  Transfer of current and future surplus National Bank gold reserves to the AHV  
Notes: Own compilation; no people’s initiative has been launched in unemployment insurance. * No people’s initia-
tive has been directly successful, i.e. accepted by the people.  
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